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Abstract This paper empirically assesses the effect of liberalisation and competition
on innovation in the postal sector. The analysis is restricted to end-to-end competition.
The effect on the incentives to innovate of letter volume, public ownership and other
control variables is also tested. Data on liberalisation, competition and innovation in
the postal sector is collected for seventeen European countries over eleven years. Three
measures are used as proxies for innovation: (1) an innovation index based on a survey
conducted for this purpose; (2) the accumulated number of innovations (based on the
same survey); and (3) labour productivity. We also develop a liberalisation index to
measure the percentage of market liberalised (in terms of letter volume). Several mod-
els are estimated by GLS. In general, the models estimated have a high explanatory
power. We find evidence that market liberalisation has a positive effect on innovation
and that an increase in the market share of the competitors stimulates the investment in
innovation, at least until the market share of the competitors reaches a certain thresh-
old. Letter volume is also significant and has a positive impact on innovation. GDP
per capita turns out to be significant and has a positive relationship with innovation in
all the models estimated.
Keywords Liberalisation · Competition · Innovation · Postal sector
JEL Classification L10 · O30 · L87
C. Felisberto (B)
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), EPFL CDM MIR,
Bassenges Station 5, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
e-mail: catia.felisberto@gmail.com
123
1408 C. Felisberto
1 Introduction
Over the past decades, network industries have been going through a process of reform.
Most network industries have evolved from being dominated by integrated state-
owned monopolies to restructured industries with private sector participation and/or to
partially or almost completely liberalised industries. The progressive liberalisation is
definitely the most important aspect of this reform.
One of the major motivations for liberalisation is the belief that competition stimu-
lates process innovation, product innovation, encourages efficiency and drives prices
down. However, the effect of liberalisation and competition on innovation in the net-
work industries was only empirically assessed recently by Jamasb and Pollitt (2011).
Reforms are being pursued without fully understanding the actual results, in terms of
innovation, of the measures already taken.
This article aims at filling this gap by investigating the effect of liberalisation and
competition on incumbent’s innovation in one of the network industries, the postal
sector. We make a clear distinction between liberalisation, i.e. the relaxation or abo-
lition of previous legal barriers to entry, and competition because liberalisation does
not always translate in the development of competition.
To this end data on liberalisation, competition and innovation in the postal sec-
tor was collected for 17 European countries over 11 years. An econometric analysis
was then performed. The explanatory variables of interest are the percentage of mar-
ket liberalised (based on the evolution of the reserved area) and the market shares
of the competitors. We control for letter volume, percentage of public ownership,
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and population density. Regarding the data
on incumbent’s innovation, 17 critical innovations were identified and the historical
operators were inquired, through a survey, about their date of introduction. Based on
this information an innovation index and the accumulated number of innovations were
computed. In addition, labour productivity was also computed.
Several models were estimated by generalised least squares (GLS). The three inno-
vation proxies mentioned above were used as dependent variable and the results were
compared. In general, the models estimated have a high explanatory power. We find
that the percentage of market liberalised is statistically significant, and has a positive
effect on innovation. Regarding competition, the market share of the competitors is
also significant and has a positive relationship with the investment in innovation. This
result is valid at least until the market share of the competitors reaches a certain thresh-
old, which was not attained yet in the postal sector. Letter volume is also significant
and has a positive impact on innovation. GDP per capita turns out to be significant and
to have a positive sign in all the models estimated. The percentage of public ownership
seems to have a negative impact on innovation but this result is very preliminary since
this variable has small variability.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, the related literature is summarised
and the hypotheses being tested are presented. Then, the data used is described in
detail. Particular attention is given to the measures of innovation used, namely to the
innovation index and to the liberalisation index. Next, the model and the estimation
procedures are presented. Finally, the results are discussed. Section 7 concludes.
123
Liberalisation, competition and innovation 1409
2 The impact of liberalisation and competition on innovation
The debate about the influence of the intensity of market competition on technical pro-
gress started with Schumpeter (1942) and continued with Arrow (1962). Schumpeter
argues that monopoly favours the development of R&D activities because it provides
the necessary cash flow to invest in such activities and reduces uncertainty in the mar-
ket. Twenty years later, Arrow investigated the effects of market structure on the firm’s
incentives to invest in R&D to reduce costs. Arrow concluded that under competition
the single firm gets more benefits from innovation than under monopoly. The intuition
behind this result is that under monopoly, part of the benefits coming from innovation
serve only to replace the monopolist’s rents earned before innovating, i.e. the monop-
olist has greater opportunity costs of innovating. Grossman and Helpman (1991) and
Romer (1990) support Schumpeter’s view that monopoly is a precondition for inno-
vation by arguing that firms innovate because they seek profitable opportunities that
arise from monopoly. On the contrary, Nickell (1996) and Boone and Dijk (1998)
support the existence of a positive relationship between competition and innovation.
Other authors have elaborated on the relationship between competition and inno-
vation, introducing additional factors like the value of the innovation and the level
of fixed and variable costs. Kamien and Schwartz (1975) and Kamien and Schwartz
(1976) show that for inventions of small value, the absence of rivalry leads to the most
rapid development, while a positive level of rivalry will achieve this for more valuable
innovations. Loury (1979) finds that, under certain conditions, the incentives to invest
in R&D of individual firms decrease as competition increases. The work developed
by Lee and Wilde (1980) reaches rather different conclusions from Loury (1979).
The authors conclude that an increase in rivalry increases the equilibrium individual
R&D effort. In an attempt to reconcile this conclusion with Loury’s earlier work, the
authors show that if fixed costs in the R&D technology are larger than the variable
costs, then an increase in competition leads to a decrease in the equilibrium level of
firm investment in R&D.
Other authors have made a distinction between individual and industry innova-
tion or investment in R&D, and find a positive effect of competition on aggregate
innovation and a negative effect of competition on individual innovation (Cellini and
Lambertini 2005; Blundell et al. 1999).
Between Schumpeter’s followers and Arrow’s defenders, a third group of authors
emerged who have attempted to combine the previous arguments in order to rationalise
the ‘inverted-U’ relationship between market concentration and R&D and technolog-
ical advance found by some authors in the empirical studies. Scherer (1967) observes
that the speed of technological research accelerates with rivalry, provided that the
number of firms competing is not excessive. Scherer is the first to suggest an inverted-
U relationship between competition and innovation. Later on, Boone (2000), Boone
(2001) and Aghion et al. (2005) also find a nonlinear relationship between competi-
tion and innovation. Aghion et al. (2005) confirm the inverted-U relationship between
intensity of competition and R&D incentives.
Felisberto (2007) develops and analyses a model of incumbent network operator
when the incumbent is a monopolist as well as when it faces an entrant. The objectives
of the incumbent are specified in a general manner to allow for revenue, profit and/or
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welfare maximisation. The marginal cost of the incumbent is assumed to depend on
the investment in new technologies. A strictly convex and decreasing cost function is
assumed. The incumbent maximises its objective function with respect to prices and
to investment in innovation. The entrant is assumed to maximise profits with respect
to prices. The incumbent’s incentives to innovate under monopoly and duopoly are
compared. The main results are that the difference between the investment in innova-
tion under monopoly and duopoly is governed by the incumbent’s market share under
duopoly and by the incumbent’s elasticity of demand under monopoly and duopoly.
For certain values of these variables, duopoly provides more incentives to innovate
than monopoly. The relationship between the incumbent’s market share and the incen-
tives to innovate under duopoly is non-linear. Until a certain point the incumbent’s
market share has a positive impact on innovation under duopoly and from that point
on it has a negative impact. The incumbent’s elasticity of demand has a negative effect
on the incentives to innovate under both market structures. Another major result is
that the incentives to innovate decrease as the weight given to revenue and/or to profit
increase. In other words, the more regulation can move the incumbent to act as a
welfare maximiser, the larger the investment in innovation is.
In short, the literature on the relationship between competition and innovation
does not have a clear answer as to whether competition stimulates innovation or not.
Increased competition is said to have both positive and negative effects on innovation.
The positive effect is a result of the firm’s quest to optimize profits through increasing
its efficiency and reducing its cost of production. Profitability pushes the develop-
ment and adoption of more efficient technologies and processes. At the same time,
competition decreases the rents of the monopolist and might reduce its market share.
Therefore, revenue will also decrease. As a result, firms will have fewer resources
to invest, for instance, in research and development. Similarly, they are also likely
to encounter more difficulties when trying to recover potential investment into new
technologies and new processes (not sufficient economies of scale)1. The lack of con-
sensus is more apparent when the theoretical results are compared with the empirical
results. The need for empirical evidence is undisputable.
The effect of liberalisation on innovation has barely been studied. Jamasb and Pollitt
(2011) examine the effect of electricity reforms on patenting activity in the UK elec-
tricity sector. The results indicate that electricity related patents in non-nuclear and
renewable technologies have increased in the post-liberalisation period. The authors
attribute this trend to the increased commercialisation of the sector and argue that
a lasting decline in R&D will in the longer run reduce technological progress and
innovation in the sector.
We argue that the effect of liberalisation on innovation depends on the presence
and intensity of natural barriers to entry on the supply side and on the mechanisms
implemented to overcome those barriers. If there are no strong barriers to entry, then
1 Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) are having a significant impact in the postal
sector and are leading to important changes in it, namely to the creation of new services and business areas.
The pressure of ICTs on innovation in the enlarged postal value chain is not negligible, however in this
paper, we focus on the traditional postal value chain and, hence, no further reference will be made to the
effect of ICTs on innovation in the postal sector.
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there is potential competition and, consequently a positive effect on innovation. If there
are barriers to entry yet there is regulation capable of overcoming those barriers and
making the threat of competition real, liberalisation will also have a positive impact
on innovation. On the contrary, if there are barriers to entry and no mechanisms to
make the threat of competition real, then liberalisation will not have any effect on
innovation.
This paper tests the following hypotheses that follow from the literature: (1) liberal-
isation in the postal sector has stimulated operators to be more efficient, and therefore
more innovative; (2) when the incumbents preserve a relatively high market share
competition favours innovation, hence, a positive effect of end-to-end competition
on innovation and efficiency is expected because the incumbents analysed here kept
market shares of at least 90%; (3) the larger the amount of goods and services sup-
plied (letter volume), the more innovative the operator is; and (4) a decrease in public
ownership is expected to have a negative impact on innovation under the assump-
tion that public ownership is the most likely ownership structure to promote welfare
maximisation2.
In the following section, the data used is described and analysed.
3 Data analysis
The dataset presented here results from the compilation of different sources and from
a survey conducted by the author. It constitutes a unique source of information for ana-
lysing the liberalisation process, the development of competition, and the development
of incumbents’ innovation in the postal sector in the last decade.
We collected data to measure the degree of liberalisation and competition in the
postal market, and the innovativeness of the incumbents (including the letter mail vol-
ume and the average number of employees). Some additional variables, namely the
percentage of capital owned by the state, population density and GDP per capita, were
also collected.
All these variables were collected for the period between 1995 and 2005 (some
were also collected for 2006), in 17 European countries and operators (Table 1).
The data used to build the liberalisation index is available in several studies man-
dated by the European Commission, as well as the regulators’ reports, the annual
reports of the operators, and the International Post Corporation (IPC) regulatory data-
base. The same sources were used to collect the data on the degree of competition, i.e.
market shares.
The data necessary to build the innovation index and the accumulated number of
innovations, two of the three measures of innovation used, was collected through a
2 As mentioned before, Felisberto (2007) concludes that the more regulation can move the incumbent to
act as a welfare maximiser, the larger the investment in innovation is, i.e. welfare maximisation stimulates
innovation. Assuming that a public enterprise whose managers operate under a charter directed toward
consumer welfare and efficiency (in pricing) may be concerned about welfare maximisation, i.e. assuming
that public ownership is the most likely ownership structure to promote social welfare maximisation it
follows that a decrease in public ownership is expected to have a negative impact on innovation.
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Table 1 Countries and
operators included in sample Country Operator
Bulgaria (BG) Bulgarian Posts plc
Croatia (HR) Hrvatska pošta d.d.
Estonia (EE) Eesti Post Ltd
Finland (FI) Itella Oyj
France (FR) La Poste
Germany (DE) Deutsche Post AG
Ireland (IE) An Post
Italy (IT) Poste Italiane S.p.A.
Latvia (LV) Latvijas Pasts
Poland (PL) Poczta Polska
Portugal (PT) CTT— Correios de Portugal, S.A.
Romania (RO) C.N. Posta Romana S.A.
Spain (ES) Correos y Telégrafos S.A.
Sweden (SE) Posten AB
Switzerland (CH) Die Post/La Poste/La Posta
The Netherlands (NL) TNT Post
United Kingdom (UK) Royal Mail Group PLC
survey (see Appendix A). In that survey the incumbents were asked about the date of
introduction of 17 critical innovations identified by the author.
We first analyse the different measures of innovation and the liberalisation index.
After, we examine the degree of competition and the remaining variables.
3.1 Measures of innovation
Three proxies for innovation are used: an innovation index (inindex), the accumulated
number of innovations (accuminno), and labour productivity (itemperempl).
Data on upstream collection, mail processing and transportation innovations intro-
duced by the incumbents surveyed was collected to build the innovation index and the
accumulated number of innovations.
The innovation index and the accumulated number of innovations are based on the
date of introduction of the following seventeen critical innovations: optimisation of
collection routes (using software); hybrid mail; digital stamp; radio Frequency Identi-
fication (RFID) used to identify trucks; RFID used to identify trolleys; RFID used to
identify trays or bags; RFID used to monitor the performance of the letter post; auto-
mated sorting machines using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) that can read
whole front side of the letter; OCR that can read hand-written whole addresses; OCR
that can read hand-written postal codes; OCR that can read machine written postal
codes and whole addresses; video coded address reading equipment—online coding;
video coded address reading equipment—scanning and remote coding (off-line video
coding equipment); automated sequence sorting to delivery route; automatic tray han-
dling systems; automated guided vehicles (AGV); and route planning and optimization
software for delivery.
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These 17 critical innovations were identified through the literature (Arthur D. Little
Limited 2004; WIK 2004; NERA 2004; Pricewaterhousecoopers 1997), the annual
reports of the operators, and interviews with experts in the postal sector3. First, the
ensemble of the more significant innovations was listed. Second, the more recent inno-
vations and the ones that have more impact on costs and costumers’ satisfaction were
selected.
The innovation index measures the innovativeness in the postal sector. It corre-
sponds to the average delay or advance, in years, in introducing the critical innovations.
The innovation index for country j in year t (X jt
)
is computed as follows:
X jt =
18∑
i=1
i
(
t, Ti , Ti j
)
i (t, Ti )
where Ti j is the year in which innovation i was introduced in country j, Ti is the year
in which the innovation was first introduced in any country (so Ti ≤ Ti j ), and where
i
(
t, Ti , Ti j
) =
{
Ti − t i f t < Ti j
t − Ti j i f t ≥ Ti j and i (t, Ti ) =
{
0 i f t ≤ Ti
1 i f t > Ti .
If a certain innovation was already introduced by a country (called the pioneer
country) and the country being analysed did not introduce that innovation yet, then
the latter will be penalised with the number of years that elapsed from the year the
innovation was first introduced until the year in question. On the contrary, if the coun-
try being analysed has already introduced a certain innovation, then it is beneficed with
the number of years that elapsed from the year that country introduced the innovation
until the year in question.
In this way, it was computed for each country and each year the number of years
the country is, on average, late or advanced in introducing the critical innovations
(the same weight was given to all innovations). For example, consider only two inno-
vations A and B (instead of 18 innovations). Innovation A was introduced for the
first time in 1995, and innovation B in 2002. Country J introduced innovation A
in 2000, and innovation B in 2004. The innovation index of country J in 1999 is
−4(= (1995−1999)+0), in 2000 is 0(= 0+0), in 2001 is 1(= (2001−2000)+0),
in 2002 is 2(= (2002 − 2000)+ 0), in 2003 is 2(= (2003 − 2000)+ (2002 − 2003)),
and so on.
The pioneer country is identified among the 17 countries plus the United States of
America4.
In our sample, the innovation index ranges from −18 until 18, which are the
maximum average delay and the maximum average advance a country can have,
3 Mr. Josef Bösch, CEO Postmail, Swiss Post; Mr. Michel Kunz, CEO Logistics, Swiss Post; Mr. Peter
Stoop, Responsible Business Technology Center, Swiss Post; Mr. Kenneth Lützelschwab, Responsible
REMA project, Swiss Post; Mr. Pedro Saldanha, Business Strategy and Development, CTT Correios de
Portugal, S.A.
4 The USA is not included in the econometric analysis because it does not have end-to-end competi-
tion. However, the USA was considered when deciding the date of introduction by the pioneering country
because, traditionally, the USA has indeed been the pioneer country introducing new technologies and
processes.
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respectively. This measure is richer than the simple count of the number of inno-
vations because it takes into account whether the innovation is more or less recent,
i.e. it takes into account the year in which the innovation was first introduced. As
explained before, for each year that elapses without the introduction of an innovation,
the country is penalised. Hence, in order to ensure a symmetric treatment of the inno-
vations that were already introduced relative to the ones that were not, a country must
benefit for each year that elapses from the introduction of an innovation.
The countries with larger technological delay are Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia
and Latvia. Italy, Romania and the United Kingdom used to have an innova-
tion index much lower than the average. However, in 2003, both the United
Kingdom and Italy invert the negative trend and, in 2004, Romania does it too.
Today the United Kingdom is above the average, Italy just reached the average
and Romania is very close to it. The innovation delay/advance introducing the
critical innovations of the incumbents from Switzerland, Finland, Ireland, Poland and
Portugal have been around the average throughout the period of study. Spain, Ger-
many, France, The Netherlands and Sweden have registered an innovation index above
the average. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the innovation index for the ensemble of
the countries.
We now analyse the second measure of innovation: the accumulated number of
innovations. This variable corresponds to the number of innovations, among the crit-
ical innovations, that were implemented until the year in analysis. The evolution of
this variable is consistent with the evolution of the innovation index.
Figure 2 displays the evolution of the accumulated number of innovations for the
17 countries.
Finally, we consider the third measure of innovation: labour productivity. This var-
iable is equal to the letter mail volume (in thousands) divided by the average number
of employees.
The data on the volume of letter mail in billions of items (tvolume), which includes
domestic and international correspondence, registered items, insured letters, newspa-
pers as well as addressed and unaddressed advertising items, is available through the
UPU database.
There have been some small fluctuations in the volumes yet not significant ones
(Fig. 3). The impact of electronic substitution on mail volumes has been weaker than
predicted by some operators. The expectations are that letter post will become more a
means of distribution of direct mail than for exchange of correspondence. The direct
mail growth should partially compensate for the loss of correspondence and transaction
mail (WIK 2005).
The French market is the one with the larger letter mail volume, followed by the
British and the German markets. For the remaining countries, the letter mail volumes
are below 7 billion items per year, in 2005. France, the United Kingdom and Portugal
have experienced growing mail volumes. The total average has also been increasing
slightly.
The average number of employees (corresponds to the whole company since there
was no data available by segments and includes permanent employees and employees
with a term contract) in thousands (empl) was also collected from the UPU database
123
Liberalisation, competition and innovation 1415
-15
-10
-5
0
5
1995 2000 2005
year
in
no
va
tio
n 
in
de
x BG average
-15
-10
-5
0
5
1995 2000 2005
year
CH average
-15
-10
-5
0
5
1995 2000 2005
year
DE average
-15
-10
-5
0
5
1995 2000 2005
year
in
no
va
tio
n 
in
de
x EE average
-15
-10
-5
0
5
1995 2000 2005
year
ES average
-15
-10
-5
0
5
1995 2000 2005
year
FI average
-15
-10
-5
0
5
1995 2000 2005
year
in
no
va
tio
n 
in
de
x
FR average
-15
-10
-5
0
5
1995 2000 2005
year
HR average
-15
-10
-5
0
5
1995 2000 2005
year
IE average
-15
-10
-5
0
5
1995 2000 2005
year
in
no
va
tio
n 
in
de
x
IT average
-15
-10
-5
0
5
1995 2000 2005
year
LV average
-15
-10
-5
0
5
1995 2000 2005
year
NL average
-15
-10
-5
0
5
1995 2000 2005
year
in
no
va
tio
n 
in
de
x
PL average
-15
-10
-5
0
5
1995 2000 2005
year
PT average
-15
-10
-5
0
5
1995 2000 2005
year
RO average
-15
-10
-5
0
5
1995 2000 2005
year
in
no
va
tio
n 
in
de
x
SE average
-15
-10
-5
0
5
1995 2000 2005
year
UK average
Fig. 1 Innovation index
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Fig. 2 Accumulated number of innovations
123
Liberalisation, competition and innovation 1417
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
year
total average
le
tte
r 
v
o
lu
m
e
 
(bi
lli
o
n
s
)
FR DE NL UK PT
Fig. 3 Evolution of letter mail volumes
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
BG CH DE EE ES FI FR HR IE IT LV NL PL PT RO SE UK
countries
n
u
m
be
r o
f e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
(th
ou
sa
nd
s)
1995
2000
2005
Fig. 4 Average number of employees for the years 1995, 2000, and 2005
except for Latvia Post. The average number of employees of Latvia Post was collected
from Amadeus database.
The countries with the largest number of employees are Germany, France and the
United Kingdom (Fig. 4). These three countries are also the ones with larger volumes
as observed before. Italy stands out because it has a relatively large number of employ-
ees although its letter mail volume is around the average of the countries being studied.
The same happens with Poland the letter mail volumes of which are approximately
half of the average, whereas its number of employees is very close to the average.
The measure ‘labour productivity’ presents some drawbacks, which are important
to keep in mind. First, labour productivity was computed with the total number of
employees and not only the employees working in the letter segment. The conse-
quences of this is that a postal operator with a large diversification of products and
where financial services, for instance, have a large weight will have a relatively small
labour productivity. Second, an increase in mail volume does not trigger a proportional
increase in the number of employees because the postal services are characterised by
economies of scale and scope. Therefore, comparisons among countries with different
mail volumes have to be cautious.
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It must also be considered that sometimes firms cannot lay-off as soon as there is a
decrease in volumes, which may cause a decrease in labour productivity. The evolution
of labour productivity is presented in Fig. 5.
Since labour productivity is generated from completely different data than the inno-
vation index, it is interesting to compare both measures.
Bulgaria has a labour productivity below the average, which is consistent with the
technological delay introducing the 17 innovations mentioned before. In the same
situation are: Estonia, Croatia, Italy, Latvia and Romania. In Estonia, however, the
innovation index is negatively deviating more and more from the average while labour
productivity is approaching the average. In Latvia, the innovation index is also nega-
tively deviating more and more from the average whereas labour productivity remains
more or less stable.
The evolution of labour productivity for the French, Dutch, Spanish, Swedish,
Finnish and Irish incumbents is also consistent with the evolution of the innovation
index. The French, Dutch, Spanish and Swedish incumbents have an innovation index
above the average and their labour productivity is larger than the average labour pro-
ductivity. In Finland and Ireland, both measures of innovation have always been very
close to the average.
In Germany, the innovation index has always been above the average, whereas
labour productivity has been decreasing and is now below the average.
Switzerland and Portugal have registered, through the years studied, an innovation
index close to the average, while their labour productivity has always been above the
average. In Portugal, labour productivity has been steadily increasing.
In Poland, there is a divergence between the two indexes: the innovation delay is
close to the average while labour productivity has always been below the average.
Finally, in the United Kingdom, the innovation index was very low until 2003, when
it started to increase, while labour productivity has always been above the average.
3.2 Measuring the degree of liberalisation
In 1998, the European Postal Directive 97/67/EC was implemented, which sets the
maximum weight limit of the reserved area at 350 grams for items of correspondence
and the price limit at five times the basic tariff for a first class letter in the lowest weight
band. The directive 2002/39/EC reduces the reserved area to items of correspondence
that weigh less than 100 grams and cost less than three times the basic tariff as of
January 1st, 2003, and to 50 grams and two and a half times the basic tariff as of
January 1st, 2006. Furthermore, the outgoing cross-border mail is required to open
to competition on January 1st, 2006 but exceptions are accepted if needed to ensure
universal service. Directive 2002/39/EC sets the full market opening of the postal mar-
kets for January 1st, 2009, subject to confirmation by the European Parliament and
the Council. In 2007, the European Parliament voted to delay the full market opening
until January 1st, 2011. The new member states and posts that work in difficult terrain
can delay full liberalisation for a further two years.
The aim of the European Commission is the gradual market opening of the postal
sector within the European Union. Besides the definition of the maximum reserved
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Fig. 5 Labour productivity (thousands of items per employee)
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Table 2 Correspondence
between reserved area and
percentage of letter mail volume
liberalised (domestic and
inbound cross border
correspondence)
a WIK (2004)
Weight limit of the reserved area (g) Percentage of
mail volume
>0 100
>50 25a
>100 18a
>150 14
>200 10
>350 7a
>500 2
>1000 1
>2000 0
area the directives also set a minimum universal service, the conditions determining the
provision of non-reserved services and access to the network, tariff principles and the
transparency of accounts, minimums for quality of service, the harmonisation of tech-
nical standards. Moreover, directive 97/67/EC required the creation of independent
national regulatory authorities.
The letter post items can be divided into four categories: items of correspon-
dence, addressed printed matter, newspapers and un-addressed printed matter (i.e.
un-addressed direct mail). Items of correspondence include letters, postcards and trans-
action mail such as bills and bank statements. Included in addressed printed matter
are: addressed direct mail, catalogues and magazines or periodicals.
The reserved area includes the clearance, sorting, transport and delivery of items of
domestic and incoming cross-border correspondence. It may also include direct mail
(addressed items only) and outgoing cross-border mail falling in the same weight and
price limits to the extent necessary to ensure the maintenance of universal service.
There are nevertheless exceptions to this reserved area. Among the countries at study,
Germany and Ireland exclude the collection and transportation of mail to a post office
for final delivery from the reserved area. France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain exempt ‘special services’ (i.e. services that are ‘distinct from the
universal service’) from the reserved area. Also, Portugal does not include ‘day certain’
delivery in the reserved area (WIK 2006).
The liberalisation index (mktliberalised) developed by the author to measure the
degree of liberalisation in the postal sector corresponds to the percentage of letter mail
volume opened to competition. The index refers only to items of correspondence and
addressed direct mail. It takes into account whether the following categories are part of
the reserved area: domestic and inbound cross-border correspondence (weight criteria
transformed in percentage of mail liberalised according to Table 2); local intra-city
mail; direct mail; outbound cross-border correspondence.
Each category was given a weight according to the composition of the mail market
in physical terms (Table 3).
Before the Postal Directive 97/67/EC, the incumbents retained monopolies for let-
ters, generally up to 1 or 2 kilograms. It was assumed that the maximum reserved area
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Table 3 Composition of the
mail market in physical terms
Source ECORYS (2005)
Domestic and
inbound CB (%)
Direct mail
(%)
Outbound CB
(%)
FR 74 23 2
DE 62 37 2
ES 75 21 4
SE 73 23 4
CH 66 31 3
NL 76 20 4
UK 69 28 3
US 73 26 0
PT 81 15 4
BG 88 10 1
CZ 76 21 3
HR 62 37 1
EE 85 11 4
FI 77 22 1
IE 82 7 11
IT 67 32 1
LV 93 4 4
PL 92 5 3
RO 75 24 2
for domestic and incoming cross-border mail was two kilograms. Figure 6 displays
the evolution of the liberalisation index for the 17 countries.
Spain was, among the countries at study, the first one to liberalise a considerable
part of its letter market. In the 1960s, the intra-city mail in Spain was fully opened to
competition. For decades, the reserved area in Spain has been restricted to letters and
postcards that are inter-urban or international. Therefore, the Spanish market is one
of the most competitive European postal markets.
The liberalisation process in Sweden started in 1985 when the Swedish government
established quality and profitability as the objectives of Posten. Posten was given more
freedom in the capital markets in 1987 and measures of consumer satisfaction were
put in place. Five years later, Posten was given the freedom to set prices within certain
limits, and in 1993 the letter monopoly was abolished (Price Waterhouse 1997). Since
then, the market share of the incumbent (Posten) has been declining. Today, the most
important private operator (CityMail) has a market share of approximately 8.5%.
Estonia and Finland have also fully liberalised their postal market. Finland took the
decision to fully liberalise the mail market in 1991, which took effect in 1994. Estonia
liberalised its mail market in 2002. However, competition has not developed in these
countries due mainly to restrictive licence conditions and taxation.
In the United Kingdom, the Postal Services Act 2000 abolished the reserved area
and from January 1st, 2006, the Postal Services Commission (‘Postcomm’) grants
licenses to all operators subject only to compliance with certain essential require-
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ments, instead of only bulk mail providers and certain other special categories of
postal services operators as before 2006 (Eccles and Kuipers 2006).
In 2004, the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs, Laurens-Jan Brinkhorst pub-
lished a paper on the future of postal policy in the Netherlands5. In this paper, he
defends the full market opening of the Dutch market in 2007, but conditioned on the
full liberalisation of the British and German markets. He justifies this position by the
need to create a level playing field (WIK 2004).
In Germany, letter items weighting more than 200 grams became open to compe-
tition in 1998. Regarding direct mail, the weight limit was firstly reduced in 1995 to
250 grams, then in 1996 to 100 grams and finally in 1998 to 50 grams.
The liberalisation of direct mail is particularly interesting because direct mail rep-
resents a great share of the total volume of letter mail. Eight of the countries analysed
here—Croatia, France, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Portugal and Switzerland—
have maintained a reserved area over direct mail (IPC 2007). In Italy and The Nether-
lands, addressed direct mail is liberalised and substantial competition can be observed
in this segment.
The definition of direct mail is not homogeneous in all the countries. In the Nether-
lands, direct mail corresponds only to wholly printed matter whereas, for instance, in
Germany items of direct mail can differ in respect to specific elements. In Spain and
Italy, direct mail is defined as items whose body is ‘essentially identical’. The Direc-
tive considers as direct mail the advertising items where the nature of the message is
the same even if there are other elements specific to each item (WIK 2006).
Among the countries at study, seven also reserve outgoing mail. These countries
are Bulgaria, Italy Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Spain (IPC 2007).
3.3 The degree of competition
The degree of competition is measured through the market share of the competitor
postal operators (in terms of volume) (mktshareE) in addressed mail delivery, includ-
ing both reserved and non-reserved areas. The sources of the market share of the
entrants are the following: ECORYS (2005), WIK (2004), Bundesnetzagentur (2006),
and the Swedish regulator.
Owing to the lack of quantitative data on upstream and downstream access, the
analysis is restrict to end-to-end competition.
mktshareE is a discrete variable that assumes the values 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11. These
values correspond to the mid point of the interval to which belongs the market share
of the entrants. For example, if entrants have a market share that lies on the interval
[0%,2%] then mktshareE assumes the value 1. If entrants have a market share that
lies on the interval (2%,4%] then mktshareE assumes the value 3, and so on. Figure 7
illustrates the evolution of the market share of the entrants between 1995 and 2005.
In the majority of the countries under study, the entrants’ market share does not
exceed the 2%.
5
“ Postal Memorandum ” available at http://www.ez.nl/content.jsp?objectid=20863 [8/10/2007].
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Fig. 7 Evolution of entrants’ market share
Spain is the country where competition is highest, followed by Sweden. Although
Finland and Estonia liberalised their mail markets some years ago, the restrictive
licence conditions and taxation policy has restricted the development of competition.
In both countries, potential entrants are required to provide postal services in the whole
territory of the country6. In Finland, potential entrants can opt for a restricted license
that implies an additional turnover tax of 5–20%, depending on the territorial coverage
of mail delivery.
The license requirements to deliver addressed mail in Sweden are not restrictive.
Moreover, there are no licence requirements to deliver catalogues, magazines and un-
addressed mail. However, not a lot of competition has developed, and the incumbent
still has a very dominant position currently. This slow development of competition
is related to different factors. Initially, the legislation was not adapted to support or
create the preconditions for competition. Also, CityMail (the largest competitor of
Posten AB) faced numerous internal problems that limited its business development
and expansion. Finally, Sweden has a large territory with a low population density,
which creates barriers to entry (ECORYS 2005).
After Spain and Sweden, the countries where competition is most developed are
Germany, The Netherlands and Estonia.
3.4 Other variables
In addition to the main variables of interest described above, we also collected data on
the following control variables: percentage of public ownership, population density,
and GDP per capita.
The share of equity owned directly or indirectly by central governments (publick)
was collected from the operators’ annual reports, the IPC Postal regulatory databases,
and the operators’ websites. Among the countries at study, only Deutsche Post and
6 With the exception of the Aland islands in Finland.
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Table 4 Variables’ description
Variable Description
inindex Innovation index
accuminno Accumulated number of innovations
itemperempl Labour productivity
tvolume Volume of letter mail (in billions of items)
empl Average number of employees (includes permanent employees and
employees with a term contract) (in thousands)
mktliberalised Liberalisation index (measures the degree of liberalisation, i.e the
percentage of letter mail volume opened to competition)
mktshareE Market share of the competitor postal operators (in terms of volume)
publick Share of equity owned directly or indirectly by central governments
popdens Population density
gdppercap GDP per capita
TNT Post are partially privatised. In 2005, the Deutsche government held 45% of the
shares of Deutsche Post and only 10% of the shares of TNT Post were owned (directly
or indirectly) by the Dutch government.
Population (in millions) was collected from Eurostat and countries’ area is available
at the UPU database. These two variables were used to build the variable population
density (popdens). Population density is in number of habitants per squared kilometre.
France, Germany, UK and Italy are the countries with the greatest populations. These
countries, except France, are among the four countries with the highest population
density. The Netherlands is the country with the highest population density.
The GDP at 1995 prices was collected from Eurostat’s statistics and used to com-
pute the variable GDP per capita (gdppercap). GDP per capita is in thousands of
euros per habitant. The countries with the highest GDPs are Germany, France, the
United Kingdom and Italy, whereas the countries with the largest GDP per capita are
Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands.
Finally, both exchange rates and inflation rates are from Eurostat.
Table 4 summarises and describes the variables involved in this study. The detailed
descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix B, Table 5.
4 The model
In this section, we present the econometric model estimated to test the hypotheses
presented in Sect. 2. Its general form is:
I nnovationit = α + β1 Xit + β2mktliberalisedi,t−1
+β3mktliberalisedi,t+1 + β4Cit + eit
where t represents years, i denotes countries, α is a constant term, Xit is a vector of
exogenous explanatory variables, and Cit is the vector of control variables.
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The contemporaneous explanatory variables included in the vector Xit are: mktlib-
eralised and mktshareE. Vector Cit includes: publick, tvolume, popdens, and gdpper-
cap.
This model is estimated for the three different measures of innovation presented
before, which are: the innovation index (inindex), the accumulated number of innova-
tion (accuminno) and labour productivity (itemperempl).
The aim of lagging and forwarding mktliberalised one period is to test if firms react
with delay to liberalisation policies or if firms anticipate future changes regarding the
market liberalisation, respectively.
The correlation matrix between independent variables is displayed in Appendix B,
Table 6.
We start by estimating a specification only with the contemporaneous variables
and control variables. Then, a second model that excludes popdens, because of its
correlation with mktliberalised, is estimated. After, we estimate a model that excludes
gdppercap from the second model because of its correlation with tvolume. We then
investigate if the t-statistics are being affected by the correlation between mktlibera-
lised and mktshareE by estimating two other models: one with mktliberalised, publick,
and tvolume as explanatory variables, and another one with mktshareE, publick, and
tvolume as explanatory variables.
5 Estimation procedures
First, the models were tested for the presence of heteroskedasticity and correlation
between and within panels. Table 7, in Appendix B, summarises the results of the tests
performed.
By plotting the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) residuals, it is possible to see (indepen-
dently of the variable used as proxy for innovation) that the means and the dispersion
are different across countries. This finding confirms the existence of a panel structure.
Also, the fact that the second moments are different across countries is a first indication
of a problem of heteroskedasticity.
A likelihood-ratio test (lrtest hetero) was performed to determine the presence
of heteroskedasticity. In all the models, the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is
rejected, which indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity. For the purpose of learn-
ing more about the type of heteroskedasticity, namely to test for inter-individuals
heteroskedasticity, a modified Wald test was performed (xttest3). The rejection of the
null hypotheses confirms the existence of inter-individuals heteroskedasticity.
It is not possible to perform a Breusch–Pagan test (xttest2) to check for correlation
across panels because the number of firms is larger than the number of time periods
being analysed (i.e. N > T ). Nevertheless, we will assume that there is spatial cor-
relation in the errors since it is very common to find this type of correlation in panel
data models. The first order autocorrelation test of Wooldridge (xtserial) indicates
the presence of serial autocorrelation in the three models since the null hypothesis of
independence of the residuals is rejected.
In the presence of autocorrelation within panels, cross-sectional correlation and
heteroskedasticity, the most appropriated estimation procedures are Generalised Least
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Squares (GLS) and Prais-Winsten estimation with Panel Corrected Standard Errors
(PW-PCSE). The models presented in Appendix B were estimated by GLS7.
GLS allows estimation in the presence of a first order autoregressive process (AR(1))
within panels and cross-sectional correlation, and heteroskedasticity across panels. The
coefficient of the AR(1) process can be specified as being common to all the panels
or as being specific to each panel. We assume that the AR(1) coefficient is specific to
each model.
Finally, a Granger causality test was performed (using 3 lags). An equation in which
y was regressed on lagged values of y and lagged values of an additional variable x
was estimated, and the null hypothesis that x does not Granger-cause y was evaluated.
It was concluded that the null hypothesis that all coefficients of lag of mktliberalised
are equal to zero should be rejected. Therefore, mktliberalised Granger-cause inindex.
However, regarding mktshareE, the null hypotheses that all coefficients of lag of
mktshareE are equal to 0 cannot be rejected. This result must be interpreted care-
fully. First, there is an important flaw of panel Granger tests: rejecting the presence
of a causal relationship for an entire group of observations when a subset of the sam-
ple does actually manifest the hypothesized causal relationship. Second, the fact that
x does not Granger-cause y does not necessarily imply that y is independent of x .
Granger causality only refers to the capacity of lags of x to forecast y. Hence, it was
decided to leave mktshareE has an explanatory variable in the majority of the models
estimated (keeping in mind that we may be facing a causal relation in the inverse
sense—as defended by some authors—or a simple correlation). Furthermore, it was
decided to estimate one model without this explanatory variable, in order to compare
the results.
6 Results
In this section, the results are presented and discussed. A total of 21 models were
estimated, using the innovation index, the accumulated number of innovations and
labour productivity as dependent variables. In all the models estimated, the explana-
tory variables are found to be jointly significant.
The use of one innovation measure instead of another does not originate signif-
icantly different results. Hence, only the models that have the innovation index as
dependent variable are reported in Appendix B (Table 8). Among the reported models
the most robust one is model 3, and hereafter we refer to it as the selected model
(the results obtained using the other proxies for innovation and the same explanatory
variables as in model 3 support the results of this model).
The fact that the use of the different proxies for innovation does not originate;
significantly different results shows that the developed innovation index is a good
measure of innovation and gives certain warranties about the quality of the models
estimated.
7 These models were also estimated using PW-PCSE, but given the similarity of the results PW-PCSE
estimations will not be reported here.
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As it will be seen in more detail the first hypothesis (liberalisation has a positive
effect on innovation), the second hypothesis (competition stimulates innovation) and
the third hypothesis (quantities have a positive effect on innovation) from section
II are accepted. The fourth hypothesis (public ownership has a positive impact on
innovation) is rejected.
The selected model indicates a positive effect of liberalisation on innovation. The
degree of liberalisation is statistically significant and has a positive impact on innova-
tion, i.e. the estimated coefficient has the expected sign. The response of the incumbent
to liberalisation policies occurs either in the same year the policy comes into force or
in the years that precede that event, that is, the incumbents may react to liberalisation
policies in advance. Nevertheless, there is less evidence concerning the effect of the
percentage of market liberalised forward one period (mktliberalisedt+1) than of the
contemporaneous percentage of market liberalised (mktliberalisedt ). It may happen
that some of the investments in innovation are decided in advance but they are only
observable in the following year(s).
The actual competition, measured by the market share of the entrants, is statistically
significant in all the models reported, and also has a positive effect on innovation. As
predicted, there is evidence that the larger the market share of the entrants, the more
innovative the incumbent is, at least until the market share of the entrants reaches a
certain threshold.
Concerning the letter volume handled by the operators, the selected model shows
a strong statistical evidence of a positive impact of letter volume on the incentives to
innovate.
In all the models reported, the percentage of public ownership is always statistically
significant but contrary to what was expected, the percentage of public ownership is
negatively related to innovation. This does not necessarily mean that welfare maxi-
misation does not stimulate innovation. It can mean that public ownership is not the
ownership structure most likely to promote welfare maximisation. In other words,
under the hypothesis that public ownership creates more incentives to innovate than
private ownership is the assumption that governments are likely to maximise social
welfare, which in reality may not always be true. Moreover, the variable ‘percentage of
public ownership’ presents almost no variability, and therefore, all the results related
to this variable should be seen as preliminary and taken with considerable caution.
GDP per capita is always statistically significant and has a positive sign, which
means that the larger the GDP per capita, the more innovative the incumbent is. This
reflects the fact that in the most developed economies and countries with higher stan-
dards of living, the general level of investment in innovation tends to be higher.
7 Conclusions
While the process of liberalising the postal sector was initiated a decade ago in Europe,
the impact of liberalisation and competition on efficiency and innovation in the postal
sector have not been assessed yet.
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This paper aims at contributing to the literature with empirical evidence on the
effect of both liberalisation and competition on innovation in the postal sector. The
impacts of quantity supplied and private ownership are also analysed.
To this end, a dataset which constitutes a unique source of information for ana-
lysing the liberalisation process, the development of competition and the develop-
ment of innovation in the postal sector in the last decade, is put together. The dataset
embraces data for 17 European countries, over 11 years. Three measures are used
as proxies for innovation: (1) an innovation index based on the results of a survey
developed for this purpose; (2) the accumulated number of innovations (based on
that same survey); and (3) labour productivity. We also develop a liberalisation index,
which allows us to measure the percentage of market liberalised (in terms of letter
volume).
Several models are estimated by GLS. In general, the models estimated have a
high explanatory power. We find evidence that market liberalisation has a positive
effect on innovation. This finding supports the idea that the threat of competition
(or potential competition) on its own induces firms to be efficient. Given the rela-
tively low sunk costs in some parts of the postal value chain, this result suggests
that those parts may constitute contestable markets in the sense of Baumol et al.
(1982).
We also find evidence that an increase in the market share of the competitors stim-
ulates the investment in innovation, at least until the market share of the competitors
reaches a certain threshold. Since competition is not very developed in the postal sec-
tor, it is not possible to draw conclusions for the cases where the competitors have
a larger market share. Nevertheless, it is also found evidence of the positive impact
that mail volume has on the introduction of innovative processes. One can anticipate
that if the incumbents lose a considerable part of their market share it will be more
difficult to have the means to invest in innovation and to recover the investments
made.
The GDP per capita turns out to be very significant and to have a positive relation-
ship with innovation in all the models.
Further work could introduce work-sharing (upstream access) and downstream
access, as explanatory variables in the model. It would also be interesting to replicate
this study for other network industries, in particular, the ones where competition is
more developed. Alternatively, the number of countries included in our sample could
also be expanded.
Appendix A
Instructions: Please fill in the dates when each of the innovations was introduced into
operation. If the innovation was not introduced yet please write “NA”
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Appendix B
Table 5 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max Observations
Country Overall 9 5 1 17 N = 204
Between 5 1 17 n = 17
Within 0 9 9 T = 12
Year Overall 2001 3 1995 2006 N = 204
Between 0 2001 2001 n = 17
Within 3 1995 2006 T = 12
mktliberalised Overall 34 37 0 100 N = 204
Between 37 3 100 n = 17
Within 9 12 105 T = 12
mktshareE Overall 2 2 1 11 N = 187
Between 2 1 8 n = 17
Within 1 −2 6 T = 11
publick Overall 95 17 10 100 N = 204
Between 17 34 100 n = 17
Within 6 64 118 T = 12
tvolume Overall 6 8 0 29 N = 187
Between 8 0 27 n = 17
Within 1 4 8 T = 11
popdens Overall 120 95 15 393 N = 187
Between 97 15 383 n = 17
Within 2 109 130 T = 11
gdppercap Overall 15 11 1 38 N = 187
Between 11 1 36 n = 17
Within 1 9 19 T = 11
inindex Overall −5 5 −15 5 N = 204
Between 4 −11 3 n = 17
Within 2 −10 2 T = 12
accuminno Overall 6 4 0 13 N = 204
Between 3 1 10 n = 17
Within 3 0 14 T = 12
itemperempl Overall 66 41 4 166 N = 187
Between 41 7 133 n = 17
Within 12 31 103 T = 11
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Table 6 Correlation matrix
mktliberalised mktshareE publick tvolume popdens gdppercap
mktliberalised 1
mktshareE 0.5438 1
publick 0.0409 −0.1267 1
tvolume −0.1522 0.0063 −0.1549 1
popdens −0.3423 −0.1162 −0.7258 0.462 1
gdppercap 0.1220 0.1336 −0.2803 0.4819 0.3787 1
Table 7 Summary of the heteroskedasticity and correlation tests performed
Dependent
variable
Explanatory
varibles
Likelihood-ratio test
for heteroskedasticity
Modified Wald test Wooldridge
test
inindex Xit LR χ(16) = 88.38 χ2(17) = 5720.62 F(1, 16) = 85.61
Prob >χ2 = 0 Prob > χ2= 0 Prob > F = 0
accuminno LR χ(16) = 113.16 χ2(17) = 682.77 F(1, 16) = 67.11
Prob >χ2 = 0 Prob > χ2 = 0 Prob > F = 0
itemperempl LR χ(16) = 312.75 χ2(17) = 87332.65 F(1, 16) = 95.70
Prob > χ2 = 0 Prob > χ2 = 0 Prob > F = 0
Table 8 Results of GLS estimation with inindex as dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
mktliberalisedt 0.009 0.017 0.037 0.040
(1.07) (1.79)* (3.74)*** (3.81)***
mktshareEt 0.351 0.375 0.478 0.645 0.525 0.388
(4.83)*** (4.26)*** (6.37)*** (8.21)*** (6.68)*** (4.43)***
publickt −0.108 −0.093 −0.087 −0.094 −0.073 −0.075 −0.072
(4.80)*** (26.89)*** (11.97)*** (11.07)*** (9.97)*** (8.77)*** (11.36)***
tvolumet 0.084 0.090 0.298 0.259 0.252 0.384 0.237
(1.46) (1.37) (8.88)*** (7.25)*** (12.17)*** (3.82)*** (7.25)***
popdenst −0.021
(2.94)***
gdppercapt 0.304 0.192
(3.84)*** (2.51)**
mktliberalisedt+1 0.016
(2.02)**
mktliberalisedt−1 0.019
(1.64)*
Constant 2.436 −1.127 0.142 −0.895 −1.492 −0.591
(0.97) (1.91)* (0.26) (1.68)* (1.83)* (1.33)
Observations 187 187 187 187 187 187 170
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Table 8 continued
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Log likelihood 1192 − − 1171 − 1215 1264
Wald chi2 379 1108 219 213 192 210 148
Prob > χ2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
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